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A. Thesis 
577 
The evolution of state securities laws (hereinafter "blue sky laws") in this 
country is a classic example of regulation that was, perhaps, initially justified 
and that was apparently promulgated with the best of motives, but which now 
is actually harmful to society. Today, blue sky laws are ineffective, philosophically 
unsound, and unnecessarily expensive, and they should be substantially eliminated. 1 
Because of the vested interests that have developed,2 however, it is unlikely that 
states will respond to this problem, and it will probably take action by the 
United States Congress to preempt the area. Such an action is appropriate and, 
indeed, is long overdue. 
• Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Centre Col-
lege; J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University. 
I. The writer would not argue all state securities divisions should necessarily be eliminated. 
If states wish to invest resources in this area, however, they should be limited to the enforcement 
of federal antifraud standards. Any legislation in the area should provide states with this option. 
See infra text accompanying note 151. 
2. The vested interests in this case are those of the bureaucrats who are employed by the 
various state securities divisions. It would, of course, be quite surprising if they were unwilling to 
fight for the status quo. Some have already defended their functions. See, e.g., Goodkind, Blue 
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The case for substantially eliminating state blue sky laws is based, fun-
damentally, on a cost-benefit analysis. This writer's research, as reflected in 
this Article, uncovered no meaningful benefit to society from state regulation 
of securities. In the areas of disclosure and broker-dealer governance, for 
example, blue sky laws merely duplicate the federal requirements and as a result 
add no additional protection for investors. Where merit regulation is concerned, 
however, the regulatory scheme is harmful to society, even without considering 
the actual dollar costs of such regulation. Although the writer does not attempt 
any precise quantification of these dollar costs to society, the article does contain 
some information and observations about the level of expenditures generated by 
the enforcement of and compliance with state blue sky laws. The inference from 
this information leads one to the conclusion that blue sky laws exact a considerable 
tribute from society. For these reasons, the Article recommends that the blue 
sky laws be essentially eliminated. 
B. Historical Overview 
At the birth of our republic, there were, of course, no blue sky laws. 3 At 
that time, and for the next few decades, the capital requirements of business 
generally were small, and there was little pressure to resort to public financing 
for such enterprises. As the industrial revolution proceded, however, and especially 
as the construction of railroads was undertaken, the need for large amounts of 
capital increased, leading promoters to begin looking to the public for financing. 4 
Reports exist of massive meetings, sometimes conducted by prominent figures, 
at which persons attending were invited to invest in certain enterprises.s Even-
tually, stocks were peddled to the public in more aggressive fashions, including 
door-to-door selling. 6 
It is impossible to evaluate accurately the extent of the abuses that occurred 
in the sales of securities during this period. 7 There is also little evidence that 
the state legislatures had any data measuring the breadth of these abuses,8 and 
Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirement?, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 79, 123 (defense of merit 
regulation by a state regulator). 
3. Although Kansas is credited with the first modern blue sky law, other states had previously 
enacted laws governing certain aspects of securities regulation. For a historical background of blue 
sky laws see L. Loss & E. COWETT, BWE SKY LAW 3-10 (1985). 
4. See, e.g., J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 9-16 (1961). 
5. See generally S. SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE INVESTOR AND THE RAILROAD 133-56 (1967) 
(discussion of industrialist George Bliss, involvement in the financing of Western Railroad Corpora-
tion during the early 1800's). 
6. See, e.g., CHAMBERLAIN, THE ENTERPRISING AMERICANS 134 (1963). 
7. See, e.g., Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541, 542 
(1979). 
8. Not surprisingly, commentators have concluded that there must have been fraudulent 
transactions during the period, but they concede that evidence as to the amount of fraud is impossible 
to find. See J. MOFSKY, supra note 4, at 17 ("Although the amount of fraud has never been 
measured, it would not be surprising to find an amount of dishonesty among promoters and securities 
salesmen consistent with the wild times ... "); Walker & Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651 (1982) (The authors 
merely conclude, without citation, that "many naive and some sophisticated investors were duped." 
Id. at 651). 
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there certainly is no evidence that the legislatures had any understanding of the
economic impact of blue sky legislation. 9 Nonetheless, the legislatures, with no
doubt the best of intentions, enacted blue sky laws, and they did so with a
flourish. Within two years after Kansas enacted the first such law in 1911,
twenty-three states followed,'" and today every state has some form of blue sky
act. "
Once the laws were in place, the next step was entirely predictable. Bu-
reaucracies were established to administer and enforce the laws that had been
enacted. Although many of these bureaucracies (hereinafter referred to as "divi-
sions") were administering laws that were quite similar,' 2 each division began
to take on its own personality based principally on the quality and attitudes of
its leader' 3 (hereinafter referred to as the "commissioner"), its staff, the resources
available to the division and, of course, the particular state's law. For the last
fifty years, therefore, issuers raising capital through the sale of securities have
been required to comply with these state blue sky laws, as well as federal
legislation governing securities.
Today some scholars realize that we have gone too far in this area, and,
as a result, some debate about the value of state blue sky laws has erupted.
This debate, however, which intensified in the late 1960's,' 4 generally seems to
have been limited to the value of merit regulation by the states.' 5 As one would
expect, authors reach different conclusions on these matters. 6
9. Because Kansas is generally conceded to have been the first state to enact a modern blue
sky law, information is available about the circumstances surrounding that legislative enactment. In
assessing why the act was passed, commentators uniformly conclude that the "wave of prairie
populism which had swept the Populist Party to power" was a significant factor in the passage of
the legislation. See, e.g., Goodkind, supra note 2, at 82.
In discussing the economic impact of the enactment of blue sky laws, one should examine the initial
implementation of the Kansas Act, since, if one is to believe the claims of Kansas' Bank Commissoner,
its implementation nearly throttled capital formation in the state. In his first report, the Commissioner
stated that "[bletween fourteen and fifteen hundred companies have been investigated by the
Department since the enactment of this law, and of this number less than one hundred have been
granted permits to sell their securities in Kansas." Quoted in L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note
3, at 9. The Commissioner was quite proud of this and characterized it as "some wonderful results."
Id.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 83.
12. Even in the early days of blue sky laws, long before the Uniform Securities Act, states
often based their blue sky laws on the laws of other states. Loss and Cowett report that six of
the states adopting blue sky acts in the two years after Kansas "were either identical with the
Kansas statute or modeled upon it." L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 3, at 10. Today, more
than one half of the states have acts modeled on the Uniform Securities Act. Goodkind, supra
note 2, at 83.
13. Certainly the personality of Commissioner Dolley, the Commissioner charged with the
responsibility of enforcing the Kansas act when it was passed, impacted significantly on the situation
in Kansas in those early years. See Goodkind, supra note 2, at 82-83; J. MOFsKY, supra note 4,
at 17-20; L. Loss & E. COWETr, supra note 3, at 7-10.
14. In 1969, the Wayne Law Review published a symposium devoted to the subject of blue
sky regulations. 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1401-535 (1969).
15. See, e.g., Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulations, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969).
16. Compare Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (1977)
with Goodkind supra note 2.
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C. Purposes of Blue Sky Laws
In order to appreciate the debate and to evaluate the soundness of these state
laws, one must understand the four typical functions of blue sky laws:
(1) They require an issuer of securities either to register those securities 7
with the state or to qualify for an exemption from registration.'
(2) They impose certain standards as a prerequisite to the right of an
issuer to sell securities to the public.' 9 The application of these standards by a
state is referred to as "merit regulation."
(3) They require registration and licensing of persons and firms per-
forming broker-like20 functions within the particular state. 2'
(4) They provide remedies for fraud in connection with securities trans-
actions.22
None of the foregoing, however, justifies the existence of blue sky laws.
The functions are either adequately regulated at the federal level or involve
areas that should be free from any governmental intrusion. As a result, society
receives no benefit for the substantial costs of blue sky regulation.
1I. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
Blue sky laws require that securities offered or sold in a particular state
either be registered with that state's division or be exempt from the registration
requirements. 23 Although this is the same basic rule as the Securities Act of
1933 ("1933 Act"),24 there are some significant differences between state and
federal registration and exemption requirements. For example, the exemptions
from state registration differ somewhat from federal exemptions.2 5 More sig-
nificantly, however, the very purpose for the state registration requirements
apparently differs from the purpose of the registration requirements under federal
law.
Under federal law, the purpose of registration is disclosure. As a result,
section 5 of the 1933 Act requires that a prospectus be delivered to each investor.2"
17. See, e.g., UNr'. SECURITIES ACT §§ 301-304, 7A U.L.A. 596-612 (1958). Since the Uniform
Securities Act has been adopted in a majority of states, references to state blue sky laws will
generally be made to that Act unless deviations by states are relevant for this paper.
18. There are various exemptions from the registration provisions of blue sky laws. Some
involve exempt transactions, while others involve exempt securities. UNrF. SECURITIEs ACT § 402(a),
7A U.L.A. 638-40 (1958) (exempts certain securities); UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 402(b), 7A U.L.A.
640-42 (1958) (exempts certain transactions).
19. For a good discussion of the various merit standards in the states, see Goodkind, supra
note 2, at 87-107.
20. In addition to "broker-dealers" and "agents," "investment advisors" must register in
most states. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 201, 7A U.L.A. 576 (1958).
21. One issue that will not be treated in this paper is the extraterritorial application of a
particular blue sky law. On the subject, see Friedman, Searching for a Blue Sky Remedy-A Forum
Shopper's Guide, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1495 (1969).
22. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958).
23. Id. § 301, 7A U.L.A. 596 states: "It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any
security in this state unless (1) it is registered under this act or (2) the security or transaction is
exempted under section 402."
24. Securities Act of 1933 § 3-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)-77(e) (1982)).
25. Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 3 and 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) and (d) (1982) with UNIF.
SECURITIES ACT § 402, 7A U.L.A. 638-42 (1958).
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In order to insure that the prospectus conforms to the disclosure requirements
of the 1933 Act, the registration statement is submitted to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (the "SEC") for the staff's review.27
The purpose for registration under state blue sky laws differs from the pure
disclosure philosophy of the 1933 Act. The Official Comment and the Draftsmen's
Commentary to the relevant sections of the Uniform Securities Act make it clear
that the primary purpose of the registration requirements is to provide the
commissioner with sufficient information to determine whether the offering meets
the substantive standards of the Uniform -Securities Act. 28 In other words, the
primary purpose of state disclosure is to facilitate the application of the merit
standards of the particular state. 29
It follows, therefore, that the Uniform Securities Act does not contain any
prospectus delivery requirement. Instead, the registration statement is only sub-
mitted to the commissioner, and there is no requirement that the investor receive
any information. 30 Section 304(d) does provide, however, that the commissioner
may, by rule or order, condition a registration by qualification on the delivery
of a prospectus to each offeree, 31 but the Official Comment indicates that such
requirement should be limited to "unusual cases." '3 2 The Offical Comment goes
on to state: "This Act, unlike the federal statute, is not primarily a disclosure
a c t . ' 
3 3
The states, however, have not been content to limit the purpose of registration
to the facilitation of merit review. Instead, most states have adopted laws or
regulations requiring that a prospectus be delivered to investors in connection
with any registered offering. 34 As a result, the registration provisions now require
significant disclosure to investors, as well as facilitate the application of the
state's merit requirements.
A. Disclosure Requirements
Certain scholars have questioned whether government should mandate dis-
26. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982).
27. Although each registration is required to be submitted to the SEC, the staff no longer
reviews each registration. Instead, the staff will review certain registration statements while assuming
a "no-review" position in certain cases.
28. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 303(a), 7A U.L.A. 606 (1958) (Official Comment and Draftmen's
Commentary); UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 304(d), 7A U.L.A. 612 (1958) (Official Comment and
Draftmen's Commentary).
The following states have adopted or substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act: Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 5,500, p. 1503.
29. One author has referred to blue sky laws as "the first consumer protection statutes."
Long, supra note 7, at 543.
30. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 303-305, 7A U.L.A. 604-20 (1958).
31. Id., § 304(d), 7A U.L.A. 612 (1958).
32. Id., § 304(d), 7A U.L.A. 612 (1958) (Official Comment).
33. Id., 7A U.L.A. 612 (1958).
34. See, e.g.: ALA. CODE § 8-6-7(c) (1984); ALA. SEC. COMM'R, Rul. 6-4-2; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-1244(d) (1980); Sec. Comm'r Rul. § 10.2. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-487(d) (1983); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 36-500-18(d) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. § 7306(d) (1974); IDAHO CODE § 30-1426 (1980); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 292.380(1) (1981).
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closure in connection with the offer and sale of securities. Some have argued
that the very premises underlying the disclosure philosophy are questionable."
Others have argued that decisions about the level of disclosure that companies
make should be market decisions and not governmental decisions.3 6 These latter
critics contend that market pressures would force disclosure of sufficient in-
formation at a much cheaper cost to society.
3 7
For the purposes of this paper, however, it will be assumed that it is
appropriate for a government to require the disclosure of material information
in connection with the sale of securities. But, even assuming the appropriateness
of mandated disclosure, the present state requirements regarding disclosure are
indefensible. The reason is, quite simply, that the federal disclosure requirements
are sufficient, and, as a result, there is no need to impose additional registration
requirements at the state level.
If an issuer is required to file a registration statement under the 1933 Act,
the prospectus delivery requirements under the 1933 Act necessitate the disclosure
of a substantial amount of information to each investor. This required information
includes balance sheets and income statements, usually audited and usually for
a period of years, information about management, information about the industry
35. H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF PURPOSE
(1979). Professor Kripke concludes:
The disclosure system was founded, without investigation or serious consideration,
on erroneous premises, namely, that the written SEC documents would be the primary,
if not the only source, of investor information, that they would be used and understood
by lay investors and that they would be sufficient and adequate for the purpose.
The Commission has shown no creative ability to overcome these erroneous premises
with a fresh start. It has been content to trumpet the virtues of disclosure, while
showing no disposition (except the appointment of the Advisory Committee) to learn
how disclosure is in fact used for securities decisions, and it has shown no creative
interest in how it could best be used.
The Advisory Committee did several things of admitted utility, including the final
shove to move the Commission toward projections. But in my opinion, its only
recommendation for a break with the past was in urging the Commissioner to emphasize
disclosures showing the amounts, timing, and certainty of cash flows. In this thinking,
it had been preceded by the FASB.
Now we know that:
-Securities selection is a process of choice among alternatives, and the disclosure
document on a single company does not provide all the information necessary for
choice.
-Securities decisions are too complicated for laymen.
-Securities decisions are made by professionals who use broader information sets
than those provided by SEC documents, including (1) better indications of improvement
of wealth than those furnished by present-day accounting; (2) projections and other
forward looking information, on which Commission policy is still tentative; (3) in-
dustrywide information.
-The SEC documents are usually filed after the information is otherwise available.
-The efficient market hypothesis raises a basic question whether efforts to use
financial information to select individual securities can yield results superior to those
obtained by buying and holding a diversified portfolio. On the practical plane astute
investors are giving credence to the efficient market theories by moving toward div-
ersification and placing the emphasis on selection of portfolios, not individual securities.
Id. at 284-85.
36. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 332 (2d ed. 1977).
37. Id.
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and the company, information about the terms of the underwriting and many
other pieces of information concerning the company and related matters. 38
These requirements regarding what information must be disclosed in a federal
registration statement and prospectus are the result of a long evolutionary process.
This evolution has involved input from a number of talented, perceptive and
experienced groups, including the SEC and its staff, the securities bar and the
academic community. 9 Accordingly, both the amount and type of information
required by federal regulations are sufficient to protect investors.
In addition, one cannot ignore the time and effort that go into completing
a federal registration statement. Usually, hundreds of hours of professional time
are required to complete a registration statement ° Also, the officers and em-
ployees of a company will spend many hours gathering and disclosing the
information required in a registration statement. Finally, if the issue is under-
written, the underwriter and its counsel will spend a significant number of hours
investigating the company and editing the registration statement.
While one may concede the adequacy of federal disclosure requirements
when a federal registration statement is mandated, the adequacy of disclosure
in offerings exempt from federal registration requirements may be less clear.
Even in those situations, however, federal law requires the issuer to make
significant disclosures about the company and the offering, and accordingly,
additional state requirements are unnecessary.
There are six exemptions from registration under the 1933 Act that have
general applicability to the sale of stock by issuers. There is the intrastate
exemption under rule 147;4' there are the three exemptions contained in Reg-
ulation D, which are rule 504,42 rule 505 4 and rule 506;44 and there is the
exemption for nonpublic offerings in section 4(2).4 Finally, there is the ex-
emption contained in section 4(6),46 the newest statutory exemption of general
applicability. 47 Whichever of these exemptions is used, federal law requires that
38. See, e.g., Form S-I adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for the registration
of securities, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7121-7126 (Mar. 7, 1984).
39. Prior to the adoption of any rule change, the SEC proposes the particular new rule and
requests public comment. Often, depending of course on the particular rule involved, the SEC
receives numerous comments from the securities bar and others.
40. The time necessary to complete a registration statement can vary substantially. One
important factor, of course, is the registration form that the issuer is required to use. Some of the
new forms, such as Form S-3, can reduce substantially the cost and time necessary to complete
the registration process. See, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 7151- 7155 (May 23, 1984) (the text
of Form S-3).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1984). For an excellent article on rule 147, see Hicks, Intrastate
Offering Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1974). There is also the possibility of an exemption
from registration pursuant to the common law that has developed under § 3(a)(l 1) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982). Because of the ambiguities in that exemption, it is rarely used
by experienced counsel. See, I L. Loss, SECURITES REGULATION 591-605 (2d ed. 1961).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1984).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1984).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1984).
45. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
46. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982).
47. There are, of course, other exemption provisions under the 1933 Act. Those exemptions
from registration, however, either involve special securities (such as government securities) or special
transactions (such as recapitalizations) or are so confining as to be practically unavailable. The
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the issuer disclose information about the deal to the purchasers of the securities.
Sometimes this disclosure is a prerequisite to use of the exemption, such as is
the usual case in rule 505, rule 506, and, probably, section 4(2). In other
instances, such as the intrastate offering, rule 504 and section 4(6), disclosure
is not a prerequisite for the availability of the exemption, but it is necessary
in order to avoid a violation of the antifraud provisions under federal law. In
either instance, the disclosure requirements are sufficient to protect investors,
and no additional protection by the states is necessary.
Under rule 505, which is part of Regulation D,'48 offers and sales of securities
up to an amount of $5,000,000 are exempt from federal registration, provided
certain conditions are met.4 9 These conditions include a limitation on the number
of purchasers,5 0 a prohibition against general advertising," limitations on resales
and, in most instances, a requirement that prescribed information be furnished
to each purchaser of the securities.12 Normally, the issuer is required to supply
each purchaser with the information contained in a Form S-18. If use of the
Form S-18 is not available to the issuer, however, the issuer must supply the
information prescribed by the applicable form.53
Rule 506 4 provides for an exemption from registration without imposing
any limitation on the dollar amount of securities that can be sold. Two re-
quirements of rule 506 are most relevant to this discussion. First, each purchaser
must be either sophisticated or an "accredited investor."" The definition of an
accredited investor includes persons who are wealthy and persons who are insiders.5 6
Second, disclosure requirements must be met before the exemption can be used.
Each issuer is required to disclose the "same kind of information as would be
required in part I of a registration statement filed under the Act."55
The requirements for exemption status under section 4(2)"8 have always been
something of a mystery. Today, however, it seems that there is a general consensus
with regard to two elements. First, the offerees and purchasers must be so-
phisticated. Second, each purchaser must be supplied with the same information
that would be contained in a registration statement.5 9 The disclosures mandated
latter case is exemplified by the exemption from registration provided by Regulation A under the
1933 Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.264 (1984). For a criticism of Regulation A, see Campbell, The
Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital
Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139.
48. Regulation D consists of 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-506 (1984).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1984).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1984).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1984). No disclosures are required by the Rule if sales are made
only to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i) (1984).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(A) (1984).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1984).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1984).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B) (1984). In 1983, the Commission issued an extensive
interpretive release on Regulation D. See, Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Release No. 33-
6455, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045 (1983). For an exhaustive treatment of Regulation D in outline form,
see Wertheimer, Small Issuers: Update on Regulation D, I FIFTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION (COURSE HANDBOOK) 377 (1983).
58. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
59. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Private Offering Exemption-Recent Developments, 37 OHIO ST.
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by rule 505, rule 506, and section 4(2), therefore, are as extensive as the disclosures
required in a registered offering. In addition, the exemptions usually impose
additional requirements (such as sophisticated offerees or purchasers) designed
to protect investors. In those instances, federal requirements are entirely adequate
to protect investors, and it makes no sense for states to impose a separate
disclosure scheme on top of the federal plan.
Disclosure is not, however, a prerequisite to the exemptions from registration
available under rule 147, rule 504, or section 4(6). The essential requirements
for complying with rule 147 are that the issuer be incorporated and doing
business in the same state where the offerees and purchasers reside. 60 For an
exemption under rule 504, the offering cannot exceed $500,000, and there can
be no general advertising. 6' Under section 4(6), an issuer can sell up to $5,000,000
in securities to accredited investors, provided there is no advertising or general
solicitation.62
Each of the foregoing exemptions is, however, subject to the antifraud
provisions under the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act"), and those sections require that all material facts be disclosed or be
available to each purchaser of securities. 63 Thus, disclosure is still required. It
is just that disclosure is not a prerequisite to use of the exemption, and there
is no particular form that tells one specifically what must be disclosed. It has
been this writer's experience that most issuers prepare and distribute an offering
circular or memorandum in connection with exempt offerings, even in situations
where disclosure is not a prerequisite to use of the exemption. Clients with
which this writer has been involved over the years have invariably conceded the
necessity for such a document, and only in unusual situations have such deals
been completed without such an offering circular. Conversations with other
members of the securities bar indicate similar experiences by those attorneys.
As to the quality of these documents, this writer has generally found the
depth and breadth of such disclosure to be appropriate for the circumstances. 64
At least, these documents appear as adequate as those prepared in situations
where disclosure is a prerequisite to the availability of an exemption.
Moreover, the issuer's flexibility to fashion disclosure documents based on
a materiality standard is an attractive feature. Excessive disclosure requirements
can, of course, throttle capital formation. For example, it would be practically
impossible for an issuer selling $50,000 in securities to prepare and disclose the
L.J. 1, 17 (1976). For a somewhat different view, see Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private
Placements, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 869 (1981).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1984).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1984).
62. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982).
63. The most significant of these fraud provisions for the purposes of this paper are section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), and rule lOb-5 promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
64. An example of this is probably instructive. The firm in which this author was a partner
and with which he is presently of counsel does a significant part of its practice in the horse business.
Normally, for horse deals, disclosure documents that are based on Form S-I or S-18 are 60 to 80
pages. The firm has also developed disclosure documents for smaller horse deals where disclosure
is not a prerequisite to the availability of an exemption. These disclosure documents are about 20-
30 pages.
As an aside, the consensus among the firm members is that the shorter document is actually
a better disclosure document for the investor.
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information prescribed by Form S-1. Costs, in light of the size of the offering,
would make such disclosures impractical. On the other hand, an issuer selling
$5,000,000 in securities probably could afford to pay for the disclosures required
by Form S-1. By defining an issuer's disclosure requirements in terms of ma-
teriality, an issuer is able to fashion a level of disclosure that is appropriate
for the size of the deal. It is essential that this trade-off be permitted to occur,
65
unless we are willing to foreclose all small offerings by issuers.
Even if one were convinced that the federal disclosure requirements are
inadequate, however, it would still be inappropriate for each state to have its
own scheme of disclosure. Inadequacies in disclosure requirements should be
remedied at the national level, for a number of reasons. In the first place, there
is no compelling need for local control in this matter. A company in Idaho
should make essentially the same disclosures as a company in Ohio, since investors
need the same basic information about companies, no matter where the investor
or the company is located. On the other hand, there is a compelling reason for
uniformity in the disclosure requirements. Without such uniformity, any issuer
making a wide distribution of securities must comply with the disclosure re-
quirements of many different jurisdictions, each of which may have "different
standards, different definitions, different exemptions and different procedures."
6
Although the only way one can truly appreciate the difficulty generated by a
multistate offering is to participate in one, even the layman should appreciate
the appalling complexity of a broad offering. This complexity, of course, adds
to the risk that an issuer will inadvertently violate a state's laws and increases
significantly the cost associated with an offering.
Finally, one must recognize differences in resources and quality between
the SEC and the divisions of the various states. The point here is not that the
staffs of the states are necessarily poor. This writer's experience has been,
however, that the quality of the SEC staff is uniformly high, while one does
not always get the same impression about the staffs of all states. This may, of
course, merely reflect the lack of resources allocated to the states' staffs by the
state legislatures. For whatever reason, it seems apparent that the SEC is more
capable of developing sensible disclosure norms than are the states. The SEC
has the resources, experience and continuity to handle this task.
In summary, therefore, this writer would argue that the disclosure require-
ments under federal law are sufficient and that it is unnecessary for the states
to impose any additional requirements. In the instance of an offering registered
under federal law, the prospectus delivery requirements insure disclosure; when
the offering is exempt from federal registration, the disclosure requirements of
the particular federal exemption or the general antifraud provisions insure suf-
ficient disclosure. Furthermore, to the extent that adjustments are needed in the
disclosure standards, these adjustments should be made uniformly by the SEC.
65. This trade-off has been recognized by the Commission in Regulation D, which requires
increased levels of disclosure as the size of the deal increases. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1984).
66. "The mechanical problems involved in preparing an issue for a nationwide distribution
under approximately forty different statutes with different standards, different definitions, different
exemptions and different procedures-and somehow synchronizing effectiveness everywhere so that
the issue may be offered on the same day throughout the country-are literally appalling." UNIF.
SECURITIEs ACT § 303(a) (1956) (Proposed Final Draft and Commentary, L. Loss & E. Cowett).
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B. Merit Regulation
From the very inception of modern blue sky laws, certain commentators
have stoutly defended merit regulation. In the early 1920's, commissioner Dolley
went on record by loudly extolling the success of his application of merit standards
in Kansas. 67 More recently, some administrators from the states have written in
law reviews attempting to demonstrate the efficacy of merit regulation. 68 This
writer is convinced, however, that in today's world merit regulation simply is
not worth its cost to society.
Merit regulation generally empowers state securities commissioners to deny
registration if the offering does not meet the substantive standards contained
in the particular state's securities act. 69 Although the standards applied by the
various states involve, as one commentator observed, "a confusing array of
substantive tests", 70 the standards typically are designed to insure the fair treat-
ment of investors by protecting investors from exploitation at the hands of
promoters and underwriters.
A major portion of merit regulation, therefore, is designed to insure that
the original owners of the company (i.e., those who own the company prior
to the public offering) do not retain an unfairly large portion of the company
after the proposed offering is completed. In this regard, a number of states
will deny registration if the commissioner concludes that stock has previously
been purchased by insiders at prices that are unfairly low. 71
Although states have developed various criteria to deal with the acquisition
of "cheap stock" by promoters, a typical formula will result in the denial of
registration if there is an "unreasonable" amount of cheap stock going to
promoters. 72 As one would imagine, states have differing tests for determining
whether the prior sale to promoters was "cheap," whether the amount was
"unreasonable" and whether the prior issuance was so distant that it was not
to be considered a problem. 73
Some states apply merit criteria that focus on the price paid for stock by
the new investors and, accordingly, will deny registration in the event the
commissioner determines the price to the public is excessive or unfair. 74 This,
67. L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 3, at 7-10.
68. Goodkind, supra note 2; Hueni, supra note 15.
69. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 306, 7A U.L.A. 620 (1958).
70. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 87.
71. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1958), which permits
the state commissioner to deny registration if he determines that the offering "would be made with
unreasonable amounts of . . . promoters' profits or participation." In a 1976 law review article,
one author reported that "[t]hirty-two states have statutory or administrative code provisions per-
mitting the denial of applications to register securities of issuers with excessive cheap stock .
" Goodkind, supra note 2, at 90.
Pursuant to a somewhat related concept, some states will deny registration of securities that
are in the promotional or developmental stage unless the promoters have contributed a minimum
percentage of the equity of the corporation. Arkansas is an example of this. ARK. SEC. COMM'R.
R. 12.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 10,484 (1984).
72. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7 U.L.A. 621 (1958).
73. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REG. § 81-7-1(C). For an excellent survey of the way various
states handle the problem of cheap stock, see Goodkind, supra note 2, at 90-93.
74. One author, in a 1976 article, stated that "19 states have adopted some form of restriction
on pricing." Goodkind, supra note 2, at 96.
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of course, is merely a corollary to the limitation on cheap stock, since both
are intended to insure a fair division of the company between the promoters
and the new investors. Again, states apply different formulas to determine whether
or not the new shareholders are paying too much for their stock. Some states
will consider a price excessive if it is in excess of some predetermined multiple
of the company's recent earnings. 75 Other states determine the excessiveness by
the dilution suffered by the new shareholders at the time of their investment.
76
Section 306(a)(2)(F) of the Uniform Securities Act authorizes the commis-
sioner to deny registration if "the offering has been . . . made with . . .
unreasonable amounts or kinds of options". 77 To the extent that the promoters
retain warrants or options to purchase equity of the company in the future, it
will dilute the investment of the new shareholders. The premise here is that this
dilution is unfair, because the new shareholders wind up with less of the company
than is reasonable or, at least, less of the company than they anticipated.
Although states have developed differing criteria for determining when warrants
or options to the insiders 78 will be deemed excessive, typically states will allow
options and warrants for ten to twenty percent of the stock that will be
outstanding at the completion of the offering.
79
The substantive standards of merit regulations are also designed to protect
public investors from exploitation at the hands of underwriters. The Uniform
Securities Act, for example, permits the commissioner to deny registration if he
finds that "the offering . . . has unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation." 80 As in the case of the
merit standards aimed at promoters, these constraints on underwriters are designed
to keep the underwriters from grabbing too much of the proceeds of the offering
or too much of the company. 8
States vary as to the percentage of the offering price that underwriters can
75. Iowa, for example, has a complicated formula that requires the issuer to file information
"in justification" of any price that exceeds 25 times earnings. IOWA ADMIN. CODE, 510-50.35(502)
(1983), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 25,435 (1980); See also, e.g., Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.02
(1983).
76. E.g., 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:080 (1983), IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 27,498
(1980).
77. UNIF. SECURITIEs ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7 U.L.A. 621 (1958).
78. In addition to promoters, underwriters are also often prohibited from taking excessive
options. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7 U.L.A. 621 (1958).
79. See, e.g., Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30(4) SEC (1984) (10%0 limit); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R.
460-16A-100 (1975), (20% limit).
There are two other types of merit regulation that deserve brief mention. First, some states
will deny registration of non-voting equity securities unless those securities are preferred securities.
See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE § 710:1-1-1, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 24,444 (1980). Second, some
states will deny registration to senior securities unless the issuer can demonstrate the capability of
servicing the interest or dividend requirements of the senior securities. See, e.g., ARK. SEC. COMM'R.
RUL. § 12.10, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 10,490 (1980). This determination is made by the
commissioner and his staff pursuant to various criteria developed by the states. Id.
80. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1958).
81. It has been pointed out, however, that underwriters' fees are a good barometer of risk,
which should also be judged and controlled by the merit process. The idea here is that high
underwriting fees mean that the issue will be a hard sell for the underwriter, which, in turn, means
that the offering must be a high risk deal. As one author has stated, "excessive commissions . .
. are a good indicator of the presence of the kind of investment risks that blue sky laws theoretically
are designed to reduce." Goodkind, supra note 2, at 89.
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take as commissions. Typically, however, states limit underwriters to commissions
of ten to eighteen percent.8 2 Also, states vary as to what items are included in
the calculations of underwriters' commissions, although any cheap stock or
warrants and options granted to underwriters are generallly included."
Proponents of merit regulation continue to argue its effectiveness, often
bolstering their arguments with reports of their own experiences or actual sta-
tistical data. Writing in 1969, the Director of the Securities Bureau in Michigan
reported that the "files in Michigan . . . are replete with cases where securities
applications were withdrawn or never filed because of objections involving
soundness or fairness and where the issuer subsequently met financial disaster." 8 4
Two other articles reported more systematic studies of the experience in particular
states.85 Those two studies reported that, based on certain criteria,8 6 companies
that were granted registration under the state's merit standards outperformed
companies denied registration by the commissioner. One of those authors con-
cluded that "the data . . . establishes a prima facie case for the utility of those
registration standards in general." '87
There seems to be no reason to doubt the conclusion that regulators can
recognize deals that are risky and that, in such instances, investors will suffer
no loss if the regulators deny permission to make the offering. This does not,
however, resolve the more fundamental issue of whether society benefits from
denying issuers access to public financing in such situations.
It is not difficult to identify the pernicious impact of merit regulation. To
the extent that merit regulation is used to deny issuers the right to register their
securities, that pernicious impact can be significant. Simply stated, merit reg-
ulation unnecessarily constrains the freedom of people to do business as they
see fit, discourages entrepreneurial initiative and impedes the flow of capital to
its most efficient use.
By denying registration under existing merit standards, a state government
is refusing promoters, underwriters and investors the right to do business and
allocate risks and rewards of an enterprise in a way that each has determined
to be in its own best interest. This is exceedingly presumptuous and paternalistic
on the part of regulators and represents a significant compromise in the right'
one has (or at least should have) to remain free from unnecessary governmental
intrusion. One should be denied the right to conduct his affairs as he sees fit
only if the benefits of such regulation outweigh the adverse consequences of the
regulation, and that is not the case in the application of merit standards.
82. See, e.g., ARK. SEC. COMM'R. RUL. § 12.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 10,482 (1980)(10%); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 13.05(2)(F) (1978) (18%).83. Some or all of the offering expenses are sometimes included in calculating the maximum
amount allowed underwriters. See Goodkind, supra note 2, at 88-89.
84. Hueni, supra note 15, at 1445.
85. Walker & Hadaway, supra note 8; Goodkind, supra note 2, at 107 (describing a study
of the experience in Wisconsin).
86. The criteria used to measure performance in the Walker & Hadaway study included thefollowing: dividends per share as a percentage of offering price; book value per share (annualized)
as a percentage of offering price; and price per share (annualized) as a percentage of offering price.Walker & Hadaway, supra note 8, at 660.
87. Goodkind, supra note 2, at 123. The other authors dodged this issue and merely "hy-pothesized that the efficacy depended on the relative performance of the approved and withdrawngroups." Walker & Hadaway, supra note 8, at 679.
19851
The Journal of Corporation Law
In addition, merit regulation is inconsistent with the very essence of a
capitalistic system. If any capitalistic system is going to work, entrepreneurial
initiative must be encouraged. Investors, promoters and underwriters must be
encouraged to evaluate which enterprises society desires and allowed to divide
the enterprises in a way that provides each with sufficient rewards to justify
his participation.
Obviously one does not encourage a promoter to take the risk of forming
and financing a new enterprise if regulators are permitted to limit the rewards
a promoter can keep in the event the deal is successful. Just as obviously one
does not encourage new enterprises by allowing regulators to limit the rewards
underwriters can receive for their selling efforts. Capital formation and entre-
preneurial initiative can be promoted only by allowing participants the possibility
of rewards sufficient to justify their efforts.
Related to this is the question of who should control the flow and use of
capital in this country. This author is convinced that the efficient use of capital
requires that the market make this determination. When one decides to invest
his capital, he has determined that the potential reward justifies the risk of the
capital. This means, in an economic sense, that the investor believes (and is
willing to risk his capital on the belief) that his capital will be used efficiently,
since society, as a result of the utility derived from the enterprise, will reward
the investor sufficiently to pay him for the use of his capital. Without a clear
and significant reason, regulators should not be permitted to interfere with this
process. Capital should be permitted to flow into those enterprises and uses
that the market demands.
In discussing the possible benefits to society of merit regulation, it is essential
that one avoid an overly emotional, knee-jerk analysis. One should be suspicious
of attempts to justify merit regulation on the basis that it saves the unprotected
and unsophisticated investor from squandering his life's savings on some dishonest
promoter's fraudulent scheme. Professor Bloomenthal has convincingly argued
that merit regulation is no serious impediment to the perpetration of fraud."
8
Promotors with fraud on their minds can either neglect any attempt to comply
with state securities laws or, alternatively, comply with those laws and then
waste, mismanage or steal the proceeds of the offering. 9 Obviously merit reg-
ulation cannot, and one would assume is not intended to, prevent such abuses.
Rather, remedies in those situations must come from the disclosure and antifraud
provisions of the applicable laws90 and from state fiduciary laws.
More to the point, however, it simply is not true that investors, without
the benefit of merit regulations, are unprotected. Most obviously, these investors
are protected by the disclosure and antifraud provisions of securities legislation.
This should not be overlooked. An issuer must either register each offering with
the SEC or find an exemption from the registration requirements. In addition,
any material omission or misstatement made in connection with a sale of securities
88. Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447,
1481-84 (1969).
89. Id.
90. This author would argue that federal securities laws are the appropriate source of protection
in this area.
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is actionable under applicable antifraud standards. As has been discussed earlier,
these provisions offer substantial protection to investors.
Finally, one must not overlook the protection afforded by the availability
of alternative investments. Especially as the deregulation of the banking industry
has continued, the competition for money among institutions has increased
dramatically. Banks now have various types of accounts that pay a fair market
rate for depositors' money. Also, each major brokerage firm has various in-
vestments that pay fair rates of return. Certainly, one would concede that the
availability of these investments is well known, as local papers regularly run
advertisements of banks and other institutions soliciting for these investments.
The point of all this is to dispell the notion that merit regulation protects
helpless and hapless investors who, with purity and naivete, invest in fraudulent
schemes. People who invest in schemes that would not pass muster under merit
regulations are people who are otherwise unhappy with the rates of return that
are being paid by banks and similar institutions. Indeed, one could argue in
these circumstances that the only effect of merit regulation is to protect investors
from their own stupidity and greed. Society should not be asked to pay much
for this.
III. REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS
State blue sky laws requiring registration of broker-dealers 9l are subject to
the same criticism as the state laws requiring registration of securities sold to
the public, because state regulation of broker-dealers adds a superfluous layer
of rules to an area that is already subject to extensive (some would say excessive)
regulation at the federal level. The result is additional complexity and cost
without any demonstrable increase in protection for the public.
In order to operate as a broker 92 or a dealer 93 under federal law, a firm
must first register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 94 As part of
this process, the firm is required to file an application on Form BD 95 and to
provide the Commission with certain additional documents and information. 96
In addition, the 1934 Act requires, with certain exceptions, 97 brokers and dealers
to be members of a registered securities association,9 and at the present time,
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") is the only existing
91. Usually state blue sky laws prohibit anyone from acting as a "broker-dealer," "agent"
or "investment advisor" unless the person is registered as such. UNIF. SECURITIEs ACT §§ 201(a)
and (c), 7A U.L.A. 576 (1958).
92. The 1934 Act defines "broker" as "any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(4),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982).
93. "Dealer" is defined in the 1934 Act as "any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for his own account." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(5) (1982).
94. Section 15(a) of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any broker or dealer . .. [with
certain exceptions] to effect any transactions in . . . any security [with certain exceptions] . . .
unless such broker or dealer is registered." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1982).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b1-1 (1984).
96. E.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15bl-2(a) and (c) (1984).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1 (1984).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1982).
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registered securities association. The application process with the NASD also
requires the firm to submit a Form BD and requires persons who are to be
"principals" 99 or "representatives"' ' 00 to file a Form U-4 and, usually, to take
a qualification examination.' 0'
As a result of these applications, one seeking registration as a broker or
dealer is evaluated, both with regard to competence and character. Under the
standards applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission, registration
as a broker or dealer is denied if the Commission finds such denial to be
"in the public interest" and it finds that the firm "or any person associated
with" the firm has committed certain acts or been involved in certain trans-
actions or proceedings that are deemed unsavory. 0 2 Similar standards are
99. "Principals" are defined as "Persons associated with a member (including sole proprietors,
officers, partners, managers and directors) . . . who are actively engaged in the management of
the member's investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation, conduct
of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions." By-
Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Article I, Schedule C, § I(l)(b), National
Association of Securities Dealers Manual, 1102A (1980).
100. A "representative" is defined as a "person associated with a member, including assistant
officers other than principals, who are engaged in the investment banking or securities business for
the member including the functions of supervision, solicitation or conduct of business in securities
or who are engaged in the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions."
By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Article I, Schedule C, § I1(l)(b), National
Association of Securities Dealers Manual, 1102A (1980).
101. By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Article I, Schedule C § 2,
(1980). For a good description of the application process with the NASD, see the NASD publication,
How to Become a Member of the NASD (August, 1980).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(4) (1982). The 1934 Act provides that the
Commission may deny registration if it finds that such denial is in the public interest and that the
applicant or any associated person:
(A) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration
or report required to be filed with the Commission under this title, or in any proceeding
before the Commission with respect to registration, any statement which was at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, or has omitted to state in any such application or
report any material fact which is required to be stated therein.
(B) has been convicted within ten years preceding the filing of any application
for registration or at any time thereafter of any felony or misdemeanor which the
Commission finds -
(i) involves the purchase or sale of any security, the taking of a false oath, the
making of a false report, bribery, perjury, burglary, or conspiracy to commit any such
offense;
(ii) arises out of the conduct of the business of a broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer, investment advisor, bank, insurance company, or fiduciary;
(iii) involves the larceny, theft, robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, fraud-
ulent concealment, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of funds,
or securities, or
(iv) involves the violation of section 152, 1341, 1342, or 1343 or chapter 25 or
47 of title 18, United States Code.
(C) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of any
court of competent jurisdiction from acting as an investment adviser, underwriter,
broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer, or as an affiliated person or employee
of any investment company, bank, or insurance company, or from engaging in or
continuing any conduct or practice in connection with any such activity, or in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
(D) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment
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applied for admission to the NASD.103
Both the regulations promulated under the 1934 Act and the Rules of Fair
Practice of the NASD govern the conduct of brokers and dealers once they
begin their business. Rules 17a-3, 17a-4 and 17a-5'10 under the 1934 Act, for
example, establish recordkeeping and reporting requirements for brokers and
dealers and require that brokers and dealers file periodic reports with the
commissioner (including quarterly and annual financial statements). Rule 15c3-
1 under the 1934 Act'05 establishes certain minimum net capital requirements
and sets cetain maximum indebtedness limitations for brokers and dealers. The
Commission is also empowered to censure, suspend, or revoke the registration
of any broker or dealer it finds guilty of misconduct. 0 6 Under the NASD
Rules of Fair Pratice, members are subject to rules governing their conduct,
including participation in initial public offerings,107 charges for services,10 8 pub-
lication of quotations'0 9 and recordkeeping." '0
State blue sky laws essentially duplicate this federal regulation. Under the
Uniform Securities Act, one is prohibited from transacting business in a particular
Advisors Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, this title, the rules or
regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Ru-
lemaking Board, or is unable to comply with any such provision.
(E) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the
violation by any person of any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, this title, the rules or
regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Ru-
lemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person
who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision. For
the purposes of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be deemed to have failed
reasonably to supervise any other person if -
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such pro-
cedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar as prac-
ticable, any such violation by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent
upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to believe
that such procedures and system were not being complied with.
(F) is subject to an order of the Commission entered pursuant to paragraph (6)
of this subsection (b) barring or suspending the right of such person to be associated
with a broker or dealer.
15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(4) (1982). The foregoing section applies to suspensions and revocations, but it
is also made applicable to the application process by 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(l) (1982).
103. By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Article I, Schedule C, § 2
(1980).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3-.17a-5 (1984).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1984).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982).
107. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Article 1II, § 1;
Interpretations of the Board of Governors Relating to § I of Article III of the Rules of Fair
Practice, Review of Corporate Financing.
108. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, §§ 3 and
4; Interpretation of the Board of Governors Relating to § 4 of Article III of the Rules of Fair
Practice, NASD Mark-Up Policy.
109. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, § 5;
Interpretation of the Board of Governors Relating to § 5 of Article III of the Rules of Fair Practice,
Manipulative and Deceptive Quotations.
110. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Article III. § 21.
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state as a "broker- dealer""' or an "agent"' 2 unless registered with the division. 3
In order for a firm to register as a broker-dealer, an application is filed with
the division," 4 and the application usually is accompanied by other documents
and information." 5 In addition, the persons who are actually engaged in selling
securities are required to register as agents," 6 which normally requires the filing
of an application on Form U-4 and requires that the agent pass an examination."17
While most states permit the NASD examination to suffice for registration as
an agent, usually a second examination is required, which tests one's knowledge
of state blue sky laws." 8
The Uniform Securities Act authorizes the commissioner to deny an ap-
plication to become a broker-dealer or an agent if such denial is "in the public
interest" and the applicant either has been involved in certain types of unsavory
conduct or is unable or unqualified to act as a broker-dealer or agent."19 Once
Ill. A "broker-dealer" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of effecting trans-
actions in securities for the account of others or for his own account." UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §
401(c), 7A U.L.A. 626 (1958).
112. An "agent" is defined as "any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a
broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." UNIF.
SECURITIES ACT § 401(b), 7A U.L.A. 625 (1958).
113. The Uniform Securities Act § 201(a) states: "It is unlawful for any person to transact
business in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under this act." UNIF.
SECURITIES ACT § 201(a), 7A U.L.A. 576 (1958).
114. Under the Uniform Securities Act § 202(a), the application is to contain "whatever
information the [commissioner] by rule requires concerning such matters as." A number of states
have authorized the use of Form BD as the applicable form for registration. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT
§ 202(a), 7A U.L.A. 577 (1958). See, e.g., 808 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 10:010 (1983). Because of the
strong push for uniformity, it is anticipated that nearly all states will use Form BD by the end of
1984.
115. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 202(a), 7A U.L.A. 579-80 (1958) (requiring a consent
to service of process).
116. The Uniform Securities Act provides that an application for registration as an agent
"shall contain whatever the [commissioner] by rule requires." UNIF. SECURITES ACT § 202(a), 7A
U.L.A. 579 (1958). At the present time, all 48 states in the continental United States utilize Form
U-4 for the registration of agents.
117. In Kansas, for example, an applicant must take and pass "a written examination in the
form and content prescribed or approved by the commissioner." KAr. ADMIN. REG. § 81-3-1(C)
(1978).
118. In Kentucky, for example, one applying as an agent is required to pass the NASD
examination and the Uniform Securities Agent State Law Examination Series 63. General Requirements
for Filing as Agent of Broker-Dealer or Issuer, revised as of 8/19/82 (available from the Kentucky
Division of Securities).
119. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 204(a), 7A U.L.A 587-89 (1958) provides:
(a) The [Commissioner] may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any registration
if [he] finds (1) that the order is in the public interest and (2) that the applicant or
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment advisor, any partner, officer,
or director, any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or
any person directly or indirectly controlling the broker-dealer or investment adviser
(A) has filed an application for registration which as of its effective date, or as
of any date after filing in the case of an order denying effectiveness, was incomplete
in any material respect or contained any statement which was, in light of the circum-
stances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material
fact;
(B) has willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of this
act or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this act or a predecessor act;
(C) has been convicted, within the past ten years, of any misdemeanor involving
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the registration is complete, state laws and regulations normally subject broker-
dealers to operational rules, such as minimum capital rules1 20 and recordkeeping
and financial reporting rules.' 2' The state retains control over the broker-dealers
and agents by its power to suspend or revoke the registration of agents or
broker-dealers that engage in "dishonest or unethical practices" or that "will-
fully" violate or "willfully" fail "to comply with any provision of" the blue
sky laws. 122
Although the foregoing is not intended to represent an in-depth comparison
of the state and federal regulation of brokers and dealers, it does demonstrate
the significant duplication between the two systems. Unfortunately, however,
more than mere duplication is involved. Because each state has its own laws
and regulations with regard to broker-dealers, an applicant is required to register
in each state where it intends to conduct business. Thus, if an agent or a broker-
a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony;
(D) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction
from engaging in or continuing any conduct to practice involving any aspect of the
securities business;
(E) is the subject to an order of the [Commissioner] denying, suspending, or
revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment advisor;
(F) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by the securities
administrator of any other state or by the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
denying or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or
the substantial equivalent of those terms as defined in this act, or is the subject of
an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or expelling him from
a national securities exchange or national securities association registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud
order; but (i) the [Commissioner] may not institute a revocation or suspension proceeding
under clause (F) more than one year from the date of the order relied on, and (ii)
[he] may not enter an order under clause (F) on the basis of an order under another
state act unless that order was based on facts which would currently constitute a
ground for an order under this section;
(G) has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business;
(H) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets or in the
sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature; but the [Commissioner] may
not enter an order against a broker-dealer or investment adviser under this clause
without a finding of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser;
(I) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience, and
knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b);
(J) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a broker-dealer or his
employees if he is an investment adviser; or
(K) has failed to pay the proper filing fee; but the [Commissioner] may enter
only a denial order under this clause, and [he] shall vacate any such order when the
deficiency has been corrected.
The [Commissioner] may not institute a suspension of revocation proceeding on
the basis of a fact or transaction known to [him] when registration became effective
unless the proceeding is instituted within the next thirty days.
120. The Uniform Securities Act provides that "The [commissioner] may by rule require a
minimum capital for registered broker-dealers." UNnF. SECURITIEs ACT § 202(d), 7A U.L.A. 580
1958). States generally have enacted regulations implementing this. See, e.g., 808 Ky. ADMIN. REGs.
10.020 (1983).
121. See UNIF. SECURITIas ACT § 203, 7A U.L.A. 586 (1958). States usually pass regulations
governing these matters. See, e.g., 808 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 10.110 (1983).
122. The Uniform Securities Act provides the same bases for suspension or revocation of
registration as are bases for denial of an application. See supra note 119. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT
204(a), 7A U.L.A. 581-89 (1958).
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dealer intends to operate in ten states, it must meet the registration requirements
in eleven jurisdictions (federal plus ten states).
Currently, the states are in the process of developing a uniform application
process for registration as broker-dealers and agents, which, when fully oper-
ational, will eliminate the need to make applications on a state-by-state basis.
Obviously, this is sensible and laudable, but it is an incomplete remedy. A
company that wishes to register as a broker-dealer in twenty states will still have
to underwrite the expense of searching the law (and traditions) of each state
to determine if the application procedure requires any additional documentation
or information and to insure compliance with the various operational rules that
must be met.
In any event, even if all states had exactly the same rules and application
procedures and if there were complete uniformity and cooperation among the
states, there would still be two systems, the federal system and the state system,
and there is no justification for that. What is needed is a single, sensible system
of regulation.
The pernicious effect of duplicative regulation o'f thf" broker-dealer functions
is not limited to application and operational situatiohs, however. There are
problems that can impact directly on the issuer's ability to raise capital. An
example will best demonstrate this problem.
Assume X Corporation forms a limited partnership to drill for natural gas
and intends to sell the limited partnership units in transactions exempt from
federal registration under rule 505.123 It is anticipated that sales will be made
to thirty-five persons in ten different states. Mr. Adams, the president of X
(the corporate general partner), will be in charge of selling the limited partnership
units. The question arises whether Mr. Adams is required to register as a broker
or a dealer.
Under the federal law, Mr. Adams usually will not be required to register
as a broker or dealer with the SEC, if he receives no special commission for
participating in the sales effort, was not hired specifically for the proposed
offering and has and will continue to have substantial duties with the company
unrelated to the sale of the units.1 24 In such an instance, the Commission takes
the position that Adams is not "engaged in the business" of effecting securities
transactions and is thus outside the definition of "broker" and "dealer". 1 25 This
does not, however, end the inquiry for Adams, since he must now research
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1984). This rule provides as exemption from registration for sales
of securities made to 35 or less persons in an amount not to exceed $5 million.
124. For a good discussion of this question and a citation to relevant SEC rulings, see N.
WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS,
1-10 to 1-15 (1977). Those authors state that employees of an issuer engaged in a distribution of
its own securities are required to register as a broker unless they:
(1) Do not receive commissions or other special compensation tied directly to the
success of their sales effort;
(2) Do not have significant backgrounds in the securities business;
(3) Were not hired specifically to participate in the proposed offering;
(4) Have substantial duties other than effecting sales of securities; and
(5) Will remain with the issuer after conclusion of the proposed offering.
Id., at 1-12.
125. Under the 1934 Act, a "broker" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of
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the same question ten more times (in each state in which he. intends to make
offers or sales). Unless the proposed activities of Adams fall outside the states'
definitions of "broker-dealer" 2 6 and "agent"' 27 Adams may be subjected to the
registration requirements under the applicable state blue sky laws.
Typically, these are not easy decisions to make. One's research often reveals
substantive and structural differences among the various states' laws, 28 an absence
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982). A
"dealer" is defined in the 1934 Act as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982).
126. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 401(c), 7A U.L.A. 626 (1958), defines broker-dealer as follows:
"Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others or for his own account. "Broker-dealer" does
not include (1) an agent, (2) an issuer, (3) a bank, savings institution, or trust company,
or (4) a person who has no place of business in this state if (A) he effects transactions
in this state exclusively with or through (i) the issuers of the securities involved in the
transactions, (ii) other broker-dealers, or (iii) banks, savings institutions, trust companies,
insurance companies, investment companies as defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional
buyers, whether acting for themselves or as trustees, or (B) during any period of twelve
consecutive months he does not direct more than fifteen offers to sell or buy into
this state in any manner to persons other than those specified in clause (A), whether
or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then present in this state.
127. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 401(b), 7A U.L.A. 625 (1958), defines "Agent" as follows:
"Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-
dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities.
"Agent" does not include an individual who represents an issuer in (1) effecting
transactions in a security exempted by clause (1), (2), (3), (10), or (11) of section
402(a), (2) effecting transactions exempted by section 402(b), or (3) effecting transactions
with existing employees, partners, or directors of the issuer if no commission or other
renumeration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any person in this
state. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or a person occupying
a similar status or performing similar functions, ii an agent only if he otherwise comes
within the definition.
128. Not only does one find substantive differences among the states, but one also finds subtle(or not so subtle) structural differences, which add to the research time necessary to solve problems
in this area. To demonstrate this, the author chose four states, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky and
Louisiana, and researched the question whether the activities of Mr. Adams, as described in the
text, would require him to register as a "broker-dealer," an "agent," or otherwise.
In Iowa, the definition of broker-dealer includes "any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others or for such person's own account." Excluded
from this definition, however, are an "issuer," an "agent" and a person "who has no place of
business in this state" if that person "does not direct more than fifteen offers to sell or buy into
state in any manner to persons" within any 12 month period. IOWA CODE § 502.102.4 (1983). The
staff in Iowa takes the position that one in Adams' situation would be exempt from "broker-
dealer" status, since he would fall within the "issuer" exemption.
The law in Iowa defines "agent" to include an "individual . . . who represents [an] . . .
issuer in effecting . . . purchases or sales of securities" but excludes from that broad definition
one who represents an issuer only in exempt transactions or in transactions involving certain exempt
securities. IOWA CODE § 502.102.2 (1983). Thus, if the limited partnership units are sold only in
transactions exempt from the registration requirements under Iowa law, Adams would not be required
to register as an agent.
In Kansas the content and structure of the act is different, although the result may be about
the same. Kansas law preliminarily defines "broker-dealer" the same as Iowa (i.e., "any person
engaged in the business of purchasing, offering for sale or selling securities for the account of
others or for such person's own account. ... ). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1252(c) (1981). Although
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of sufficient administration or court guidance necesssary to solve the questions
with any meaningful degree of certainty 29 and, occasionally at least, an ad-
the definition excepts from the definition of "broker-dealer" an "agent" and an "issuer," it does
not have any exemption based upon the minimum number of transactions within a 12 month period,
as was found in Iowa. Nonetheless, the Kansas staff takes the position that one like Adams would
be excluded from the broker-dealer definition, again apparently because he is an "issuer."
The defintion of "agent" in Kansas is similar to the Iowa definition, in that it includes an
"individual . . . who represents [an] . . . issuer in effecting . . . sales of securities." The exception
from the definition of agent is more narrow than the Iowa definition, however, since one effecting
exempt transactions on behalf of an issuer is not excluded from the definition of "agent" under
the Kansas provision. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1252(b) (1981). Although such a person is an "agent"
within the Kansas definition, he is not required to register with the Commissioner, if he limits his
activities to sales of securities in exempt transactions, since a subsequent provision excludes such
an agent from the requirements of registration. KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-1254 (1981). Thus, if the
limited partnership units are sold only in transactions exempt under Kansas law, Adams, although
he may be an agent, would not have to register. There are, however, differences between the exempt
transactions securities in Iowa and Kansas. Compare IOWA CODE § 502.203 (1983) with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1262 (1981).
Under Kentucky law, a "broker-dealer" is defined as one "engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own account," which is the same
basic definition as found in Iowa and Kansas. The Kentucky statute excludes from the definition
an "agent," an "issuer" and one "who has no place of business in this state if during any period
of twelve consecutive months he does not direct more than fifteen offers to sell . . . into the
state." KY. REV. STAT. § 292.310(3) (Supp. 1984). This latter exception differs from the Iowa statute
and the Kansas statute. The staff of the Kentucky division would probably take the position that
Adams was not a "broker-dealer," since he is not "engaged in the business" of buying or selling
securities. The staff may take a different position, however, if Adams had been engaged in selling
on behalf of other partnerships he had formed.
Kentucky defines "agent" similarly to the previous two states ("any individual ... who represents
[an] . . . issuer in effecting . . . purchases or sales of securities." KY. REV. STAT. § 292.310(2))
(Supp. 1984). The definition exempts one representing an issuer only with regard to exempt transactions
or with regard to the sale of certain exempt securities. Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.310(2) (Supp. 1984).
Again, if the sales by Adams are completed in compliance with a transactional exemption under
Kentucky law, Adams will be exempted from the definition of "agent." But, the transactional
exemption in Kentucky differs from those in Iowa and Kansas. Compare KY. REV. STAT. § 292.410
(Supp. 1984) with KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-1262 (1981) and with IOWA CODE § 502.203 (1983).
In Louisiana, one finds a different structure, different definitions and, quite possibly, a different
outcome. In Louisiana, the agent concept is embodied in the definition of "agent-salesman" but
that definition does not include persons who sell on behalf of an issuer. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:701(6) (Supp. 1984). It would not, therefore, include Adams. The definition of "broker-dealer,"
however, is the troublesome category for Mr. Adams. That term is defined as a "person . . . who
in this state engages either for all or part of his time . . . in the business of selling any securities
issued by another person." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:701(4) (Supp. 1984). The definition contains
no express exemption for an "issuer" and contains no exemption for one without a residence in
the state who executes some minimum number of transactions in a twelve month period.
In determining whether someone like Adams would be required to register as a broker-dealer,
the commissioner seems to apply standards somewhat similar to those applied by the SEC at the
federal level. However, it is apparent that the commissioner views the decision more intuitively than
does the SEC. The commissioner stated to this writer, in response to a telephone call on this matter,
that the definition was like the statement that has been made about the definition of pornography:
"I can't define it, but I know it when I see it." Normally, however, the commissioner indicated
that a single offering by an issuer would not require the registration by someone like Adams.
Notwithstanding the foregoing expression by the commissioner, this writer previously received
a different opinion from the commissioner regarding the sale of a limited partnership unit in
Louisiana. See infra note 130.
129. For example, neither Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky nor Louisiana, which were the four states
surveyed in the preceeding footnote, has any administrative regulations further defining or clarifying
the definitions of "broker-dealer" or "agent."
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ministrative interpretation that one considers bizarre.'3 0 Notwithstanding these
difficulties, a decision must, of course, be made with regard to each state.
If it is determined that Adams is required to register as a broker-dealer or
an agent in a particular state, that state probably must be excluded from the
offering, since as a practical matter it is impossible for Adams to register. Not
only are officers like Adams unwilling to endure the burden of making appli-
cations and taking examinations, but the time required to complete the process
practically excludes this possibility.
The point of this discussion is to demonstrate that the pernicious impact
of allowing states to regulate the broker function goes beyond the multiplicity
of registration requirements and operational rules. The state regulations can
retard capital formation by adding substantial expenses to an offering and, in
some instances, excluding issues from particular states.' 3' Even if an issuer is
able to complete its particular offering, however, the extra expense involved in
resolving these issues represents a waste of society's resources. Society simply
does not benefit by having an issuer resolve the broker-dealer question eleven
times instead of one.
IV. ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
The antifraud provisions under state blue sky laws are essentially innocuous
and, therefore, deserve little treatment in this paper. Notwithstanding, this writer
would argue that, on balance, the state antifraud provisions should be preempted
in favor of the federal antifraud provisions, 32 since it would, at least to some
degree, reduce the possibility of unnecessary regulation at the state level.
The antifraud provision of the Uniform Securities Act prohibits, "in con-
nection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security . . .," the use of any
130. While this author was engaged in practice, he structured an offering of limited partnership
interests under old Rule 146. The vice president of the corporate general partner was the person
who had the necessary expertise for the partnership's business, and it was anticipated that he would
be in charge of all partnership affairs. Also, he would sell the units, taking no commission for his
efforts. In a particular state, one potential offeree was identified as the only person in that state
to whom an offer would be made. The commissioner in that state took the position that if the
sale were made by the vice president of the corporate general partner that he (the vice president)
would have to register as a broker-dealer. As an alternative, the commissioner suggested that the
sale could be effected through a person already registered in the state as a broker-dealer. When it
was pointed out to the commissioner that paying a commission to such an outside broker-dealer
may destroy the small offering exemptions of certain other states where offers were to be made,
the commissioner replied that that was our problem and not his. He was right, of course. Frustrated
and seeing, by that point, that we were not going to be able to make our one offering in that
state, I asked how the commissioner handled the situation where a three person corporation in a
small town sells 10 additional shares of stock to a local accountant who wants to invest. Would
the president of the corporation, who sold those ten shares, be a "broker-dealer"? The commissioner
stated that the division handled that "on a case-by-case basis." At that point, the conversation
was terminated.
No offer was made in that state. The offering was completed. At this point, it appears that
the limited partnership will be quite profitable for the investors.
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
132. There is, of course, no single federal standard for fraud. Instead, it depends, at least
to some extent, on the particular federal statute or regulation that is available to or utilized by
the plaintiff. Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) with rule lOb-5,
15 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
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"device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," any "untrue statement of material fact,"
the failure "to state a material fact necessary . . . to make [other] ...statements
• ..not misleading" and "any act, practice, or course of business which operates
• . . as a fraud or deceit . ... ,"'I' Obviously, this section is, as the Official
Comment points out, substantially the same as rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act. 34
Also, of course, it overlaps with section 12(a) and Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.' 5
Although state antifraud rules duplicate the federal standards, little pernicious
effect is caused by this duplication. There are two reasons for this lack of
pernicious effect. First, the state antifraud rules are fundamentally the same as
the federal antifraud rules, each requiring an issuer, in connection with the sale
of securities, to disclose all material facts and to refrain from making material
misstatements about the transactions and the company. 3 6 As a result, compliance
with federal standards normally insures that an issuer is in compliance with
state standards, which means that the issuer is not subject to additional expense
or difficulty because of the state provisions. Second, compliance with state
antifraud provisions does not require any filing or administrative approval as
a prerequisite to the completion of a proposed transaction. 37 Again, therefore,
compliance with state antifraud provisions does not subject the issuer to additional
obstacles or expenses.
There is, of course, always the possibility that states could define their
antifraud provisions differently from the federal provisions.13 1 While it is unlikely
that such variations, even if they were to occur, would substantially increase
the costs to issuers or impede capital formation, this possibility provides the
basis for the argument in favor of pre-emption of the state antifraud provisions.
For example, states could define materiality more broadly than the federal courts
133. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958).
134. "Section 101 is substantially the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5.
• ." U.NIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958) (Official Comment). One difference,
however, is that rule lOb-5 is limited to "the purchase or sale of any security," 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1984), while § 101 covers "the offer, sale, or purchase of any security." UNIF. SECURITIES
ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958). Offers of securities by the use of materially misleading statements
or omissions are prohibited by § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
• 135. 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). For discussion of § 12(2), See L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1021-29 (1983); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 777-81 (5th ed. 1981). For a discussion of section 17(a), see
Scholl & Perkowski, An Implied Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has
Said "No," But Is Anybody Listening? 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41 (1981); Note, Section 17(a) of
the '33 Act: Defining the Scope of Antifraud Protection, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 859 (1980).
136. This characterization is, of course, an oversimplification, since it is not clear, for example,
how states might resolve more complicated issues such as those presented by Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) and Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
137. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958).
138. One area where this has happened is in the definition of a "security" under some state
laws. Most state laws define a "security" substantially the same as the federal statute, and invariably
included in the state definition is the term "investment contract." See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES ACT
§ 401(l), 7A U.L.A. 628 (1958). State courts, however, in defining the term "security" under blue
sky laws, differ as to how closely they follow federal interpretations. Compare Rose v. Dobras,
624 P.2d 887, 889 (Ariz. 1981) ("[flederal interpretations are often looked to for guidance"), with
State By Spannus v. Coin Wholesalers. Inc., 250 N.W.2d 583, 588 (Minn. 1976) (acknowledging
that Minnesota's definition of a security is "broader and more flexible" than the federal definition).
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have defined the concept.' 3 9 If that were to happen, issuers would be faced with
researching and evaluating the materiality standard in multiple jurisdictions,
which would raise all the problems discussed previously in this paper.'1°
Although one must admit that the specter of inconsistent definitions and
the fear of pernicious effects following therefrom are not particularly troubling
at this point, there simply is no reason for the states to enact separate laws
and regulations governing securities fraud. To the extent state regulation is the
same as the federal rules, it is superfluous. Any variations between state and
federal standards generate costs and burdens in excess of any benefit to society.
V. CONCLUSION
The costs of blue sky regulation, while sometimes difficult to identify and
usually impossible to quantify, are not, by all evidence, insubstantial. 4 ' For
example, it is obvious that the states annually spend millions of dollars pro-
mulgating, administering and enforcing blue sky laws. Each year, the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) solicits information
concerning the funding, expenditures and revenues of the states' blue sky divisions.
For the year 1983, this author received the NASAA information on thirty states,
which reflected total expenditures of approximately $25.6 million for all thirty
divisions.' 42 The average expenditure of each reporting state, therefore, was
approximately $853,124, which leads one to infer that total expenditures for all
states may be as much as $40 million.' 43
139. The Supreme Court has defined a fact as material if there is a "substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important." TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added). Prior to that case, some courts had defined a fact as
material if it involved a substantial likelihood that a "reasonable shareholder might consider it
important." See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (1975), rev'd, 426
U.S. 438 (1976).
140. A similar problem has occurred due to the fact that each state has its own definitions
of a "security," and at least some states have refused to follow the federal definition of a "security."
See supra note 138. As a result, if one is attempting to avoid regulation by structuring a particular
deal outside the definition of a "security," he is required to research the definition of a "security"
under federal law and under the laws of each applicable state.
141. In his book, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND USA, Benston categorizes
the costs that may be generated by the disclosure requirements of federal law as direct costs, indirect
costs and opportunity costs. G. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE
USA (1976). Direct costs include, for example, the costs paid by an issuer to register with the SEC
or to qualify for an exemption from such registration. Direct costs to the government include the
costs associated with reviewing registration statements and otherwise enforcing securities laws. Id.
at 154. Benston cites the reported difficulty of corporations in finding competent outside directors,
due to the added risk and pressure that compliance with securities laws places on such directors,
as an example of indirect expenses of securities regulation. Id. at 155. Finally, Benston points out
that the added burden caused by regulation of securities at the federal level can result in delays
in offerings and even in the failure to undertake or complete securities offerings. Benston labels
the costs associated with such delays and incompletions as opportunity costs. Id.
142. NASAA refused to supply complete information to this author. At first the officials of
NASAA agreed to supply the information, but, after further reflection, they concluded that the
information was "proprietary" and, therefore, that they could not release the information.
143. This inference is based on the assumption of approximating 50 divisions that enforce
blue sky laws. The information that this writer obtained for 1982 indicates smaller expenditures
than the 1983 results reported in the text. For 1982, this writer obtained information on 25 states,
which spent a total of approximately $14.8 million to support their blue sky divisions. This was
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Blue sky laws also involve significant direct costs to the issuers of securities.
For example, an issuer involved in a registered offering is required to "blue
sky" the offering in each state in which selling activity is to occur. In 1983,
approximately 5,000 registration statements became effective with the SEC.'4 If
one were to assume that each of these registration statements involved $10,000
in legal expenses for the blue sky work,145 total legal fees for all these offerings
would be approximately $50,000,000.
Additionally, there are thousands of unregistered offerings each year, which
may involve substantial legal expenditures in order to insure compliance with
applicable blue sky laws. Regarding the number of such unregistered offerings,
the SEC received filings'4 indicating that there were approximately 11,000 Reg-
ulation D offerings during 1983.147 Since no such filings are required for intrastate
offerings or offerings under section 4(2), there is no valid indication of the number
of such offerings. Regarding the costs of "blue skying" these unregistered offer-
ings, one should not assume that they are necessarily insubstantial.' 48 Although
most unregistered offerings involve offers to a limited number of persons, which
will tend to reduce the number of states involved in the unregistered offering,
the problems, to some extent, are sometimes more complicated than those en-
countered in a registered offering.'
4 9
In the area of broker-dealer regulation, compliance with the state regulations
requires brokerage firms to spend substantial amounts of time and money. Not
only are the firms and many of their employees required to register with the
states, but firms also are required to monitor the laws of each jurisdiction
regarding the conduct of their business in that state. '0 Obviously, this burden
an average of approximately $572,000 per state, which would indicate total expenditures (based on
50 divisions) of approximately $28 million.
The difference between the 1983 and 1982 numbers appears principally to be caused by the
particular states included in the available information. For example, this writer did not have
information on California for 1982. In 1983, California reported a budget of $7,264,000. Other
large budgets for 1983 included Ohio, approximately $2.5 million, and Texas, approximately $1.9
million.
144. Telephone conversation with an employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on March 22, 1984.
145. This writer's experience and conversations with other attorneys indicate that the legal
expenses associated with a broadly distributed, registered offering may reach $25,000. Legal expenses
can, of course, be significantly less, depending upon the breadth of the distribution, the skills of
the law firm, the firm's hourly rate and other factors.
146. Form D must be filed with the Commission for each offering made under Regulation
D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1984).
147. Telephone conversation with an employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on June 21, 1984.
148. While in practice in 1980, this author was involved in an offering under old rule 146.
He cleared that exempt offering in approximately 30 states. The legal fees for that blue sky work
were approximately $8,000. This author is aware of a later deal under Regulation D that was cleared
in nearly 50 states, where the legal expenses probably approached $20,000.
At the other end of the spectrum, deals completed under an intrastate exemption may not
involve any significant legal expenses for blue sky work, because only one state is involved.
149. For example, in registered offerings an issuer may not be faced with any significant
broker-dealer questions, since the deals are often sold by registered, professional brokers. Unregistered
offerings, on the other hand, are usually sold without the aid of professional underwriters and thus
raise questions of whether the persons involved in the sale campaign may fall within the definitions
of "broker-dealer" or "agent." See supra text accompanying notes 124-32.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 92-132.
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is greater on larger firms, which may have hundreds of agents and many offices
throughout the country.' 5 '
This description of costs is not intended to be precise or to be exhaustive
of the costs to society of blue sky regulation. It is, however, intended to suggest
that millions of dollars are spent each year on a system of regulation that
provides no significant protection to investors and retards capital formation.
Only legislative inertia and bureaucratic entrenchment can explain this present
state of affairs.
The remedy for this situation, however, does not require that states be
excluded entirely from the regulation of securities. In fact, states could play a
vital role in the enforcement of securities rules, if their role were limited so as
to avoid the problems described in this Article. The most sensible solution would
be to limit the state role to the enforcement of federal antifraud standards and
to leave states free, to the extent they see fit, to invest resources to enforce
these antifraud laws. State divisions, therefore, would no longer be in the business
of registering issues or broker-dealers or enforcing merit standards. Instead, the
divisions would be involved exclusively in the enforcement of federal antifraud
standards. This would avoid duplication while maximizing the coordination
between the two systems.
This writer recognizes, as stated earlier, that the changes suggested in this
paper will probably be stoutly resisted by the people presently engaged in state
regulation of securities. Federal legislation, therefore, may be required to alleviate
the problem. Whatever the source of the solution, the problem needs treatment.
151. This writer talked with a number of large brokerage firms concerning the expenses of
complying with state broker-dealer requirements. While he was unable to get any exact figures, it
was agreed that such expenses were substantial. One firm estimated that it had approximately four
full-time employees engaged in state compliance. Another firm estimated that it spent in excess of
$700,000 during 1983 in state fees just for renewal applications for their brokers.
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